Abstract. Today, network technologies can handle throughputs up to 100Gbps, transporting 200 million packets per second on a single link. Such high bandwidths impact network ow analysis and as a result require signicantly more powerful hardware. Methods used today concentrate mainly on analyzes of data ows and patterns. It is nearly impossible to actively look for anomalies in network packets and ows for a small amount of change of monitoring patterns could result in big increases in potentially false positive incidents. This paper focuses on multi-criteria analyzes of systems generated data in order to predict incidents. We prove that systems generated monitoring data are an appropriate source to analyze and enable for much more focused and less computationally intensive monitoring operations. By using appropriate mathematical methods to analyze stored data it is possible to obtain useful information. During our work, some interesting anomalies in networks were found by utilizing simple data correlations using monitoring system Zabbix. We concluded that it is possible to declare that deeper analysis is possible due to Zabbix monitoring system and its features like Open-Source core, documented API and SQL backend for data. The result of this work is a new approach to the analysis containing algorithms which allow to identify signicant items in monitoring system.
Introduction
Network and security incidents can be seen as unrelated system events which correlate together by using mathematical models. The generally incidents start, continue and then end, and during this time there will be some system events and process changes that will correlate. In principle, it is inecient to perform high-speed deep analysis of all communication. There is a better approach -to nd correlations between processes and after this, do deep analysis only in small time window found as a result of processes analysis. Let's take an attack on the SMTP server and as an example: a standard network trafc analysis cannot accurately and entirely spot this attack. It can, however, be noticed by analyzing the SMTP server logs, correlate events with disk IOPS and CPU load. It is rather challenging for a network administrator to foresee all kind of incidents and defend against them. An attacker (black hat) just needs to succeed once, while security and network admins (white hats) have to succeed every time to protect an organization from successful cyber-attack. It is this inequality that calls for a new approach in using existing technology. Most networks are already equipped with monitoring systems capable of recording important system and network properties and logs, such as CPU utilization, processes running, disk load, utilization and errors on network ports, to mention just a few. This collected data is stored in the database and network administrators can manipulate it to produce useful graphs or reports. Furthermore, monitoring systems allow for trigger management to allow for simple rules such as "if the port Eth0/0 is greater than 80% in 5 minutes, send an email".
This paper explains the new and ecient method to analyze monitoring systems data to predict anomalies and cyber-attacks. The advanced analysis employs neural networks and machine learning methods. A well trained neural network can predict known and unknown types of incidents with high probability, and warn administrators before these occur. Other approaches exist based on Articial Intelligence that can be used for this purpose, for example, based on markovian model [1] , [2] or based on swarm intelligence [3] , [4] . It is also possible to nd the real cause of the problem. For example, when indicator (e.g. free disk space) is out of range, but the actual cause is elsewhere (the attack on a service). The big advantage of using network and system monitoring tools is that the basic correlation rules are already in monitoring systems as these are typically set up to inform administrators about abnormal behavior that could impact system availability. This present a suitable way to train neural networks.
There are many dierent monitoring systems. All the principles written here are theoretically applicable to any monitoring tool. However, we selected Zabbix [5] , an Open-Source project. The main selection reason is the proper organization of internal data and history in this system, the possibility of in-depth, focused and automated analyses directly using SQL and open API.
We developed a new open-source tool, Monda [6] . Its primary purpose is a selection and preprocessing Zabbix data allowing the use of more sophisticated mathematical methods and procedures. The project is hosted on Github.com server and is accessible to the entire community. The project currently includes 6200 lines of source code. It has been designed for team collaboration and allows adding of new analyses.
Methods
There are a variety of methods to search for incidents in networks. Let us mention at least the most basic and most used techniques. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages and can be used for a specic type of incident to be more successful [7] . There can be some security incidents (like a compromise of the system, DOS attack) or regular incident (like the system is overloaded due to misconguration or lack of disk space). Each event leaves a footprint and can be found by using some analysis [8] . For a faultless operation of the network, it is very crucial to prevent any incidents. This can be achieved by proper conguration and backup services. But even in the well-congured network, there are some incidents which cannot be manually predicted by the administrator due to a big amount of event and state combinations. Therefore, some automatized prediction of incidents is important.
We can say that if we want to manage network uninterrupted, the monitoring system is a crucial part of it. We need to monitor and track most of the network equipment and servers to have a real footprint of the network. It is ineffective to record the network logs without monitoring them. It can occur very often that some data source (from some security probe) is missing due to failure. If we do not monitor this, the network seems to be without problems even if there is security incident on the background.
There is yet another reason for network monitoring. If an attacker knows where security device is located and he knows its vulnerabilities, he can focus the rst attack directly there. If this attack is successful, a security device is not functioning properly, and there is no monitoring enabled, the administrator will not know about this and next attacks. 3 .
State of The Art
There are a lot of tools to identify and classify network incidents, but there is no tool based on data from the monitoring system. We choose Zabbix and data from Silesian University to do further analysis of data because of their availability and because of Zabbix features.
The correct choice of methods is crucial for any analysis. The best way seems to use neural networks and their self-organization. Current systems utilizing neural networks are usually specialized for one source of analyzed data. There are software and hardware platforms that can detect anomalies in network trac by inspecting packets or streams [8] . Similarly, there are platforms which can analyze the log les [7] . Their disadvantage is a mostly narrow focus. Even if information from ows is important, it's usually not enough for deeper analysis because there is no following information, such as load for each server or network elements. Modern devices can classify trac based on the days of the week and time of day to respect common usage in networks based on work hours and work days. It is even possible to use special probes as source of data for monitoring systems like VoIP attack analysis [9] [11].
The generally, security must be carried very carefully to arise from the incident, so hierarchically. The local network is needed to set antispoof and general ban of unsafe services that are not used. Goodly congured network should not allow trivial attacks like faking MAC addresses, IP addresses or ARP. As an opposite, in carrier level network, there has to be the only limited amount of interventions. A typical example of the attacks on the carrier level where the attacks to some news sites in the Czech Republic. Even though the stream of data is owing across most of the big operators, the real protection against attacks must occur at the server itself. Our goal was to elect interesting data from the monitoring system and use them for further analysis. There are a lot of data in the monitoring system. 4 . Algorithms
In this part, we focus on issues concerning data selection, algorithms and data structures.
Data Selection
To be able to focus and orientate in a huge amount of data, pre-processing is needed. This part of the analysis is crucial. It would not be possible to do complex analysis of all data in the monitoring system. And it would not direct to the right results. Even for future, the preprocessing part will be the primary place for any optimization and improvements. Mathematical principles and formulas are strict, and their algorithms are known and well optimized. But preprocessing is data specic and has to be driven with a focus on features of inside data. There are a lot of data inside monitoring system, and there are many kinds of it. It can be a number, specifying the state of the interface which is an integer from 0 to 10, it can be a oat as processor load or an integer which saves actual disk free space in bytes. Small change in one item is not important but same change in another item can mean a big problem in the network. Even more, data have some specic features like recurrence, statistical features, and some statistical associations [12] . From this reason, we have made our own Open-Source software Monda, hosted on GitHub, which is highly congurable and which does pre-processing part (but even more). Our goal was to create a framework and environment where every user can create its version of preprocessing strategies based on his setup. After we created and tested Monda, it became possible to do further analysis of data focused to Time Window, Host or network process. One big advantage of this software is that it can be automatized.
The primary goal of our work is in an innovative approach to selection and pre-processing of data using algorithms above. We used dimensionless quantity LOI (Level Of Interest), which is an integer. The bigger LOI is, the more interesting data are. Algorithms and formulas used will be explained later. A further mathematical analysis is based on LOI. When doing some complex computation, objects with highest LOI are selected rst. If there are enough CPU, RAM, and disk size, it is theoretically possible to analyze all data inside or all data for specic Time Window only. But LOI will do a preview of data inside Zabbix and selects most interesting data for subsequent analysis. As shown in Fig. 1 , Item which seems to be important in one Time Window can be uninteresting in another window. The typical example is free disk space. In most Time Windows, there is no change of it. But in the specic window where some attack aected it, change can be bigger, and Item can be interesting at this time. The algorithm used in pre-processing will prefer a combination of Item and Time Window if there are more changes. See below. Same to Time Windows, there can be interesting and uninteresting one. During work hours, there are a lot of changes in network metrics and these windows will be preferred. On the opposite side, night hours can be skipped because there were no interesting processes.
Step by step algorithms follows.
1) Time Windows
For all Time Windows, Item statistics are computed. It means that for each Time Window, Zabbix history is searched, analyzed and computed for all Items found inside. Some Items are automatically removed at this part of the analysis because there is not enough data for them in given window. For example, for Item "disk free bytes" which is fetched each 20 minutes there is not enough data in 1-hour window (3 values) to do any proper analysis over it.
There are basic statistics computed for each Time Window, see below. All constants are congurable by Monda. This is the rst place where data are reduced. Useless data (Items with small changes, Items without history or Items with 
2) Time Window Statistics
• found -overall number of items found in window
• lowcnt -items with low number of values
• lowavg -items with mean which is near to zero
• lowstddev -items with small standard deviation
• lowcv -items with small coecient of variation
• avgcnt -average count of history data per item
• avgcv -mean of coecient of variation
• Level of Interrest LOItw (1).
3) Correlation Statistics 
There are two steps of computation as is depicted in equation 2. This is due to reason that computations are SQL based and are computed directly on SQL server to be fast enough. Some databases can compute cov (X, Y ) directly, but because of compatibility reasons, we use two steps which work on almost any database engine. 
4) Correlation within same

Neural Networks
After pre-processing, interesting data was fed into neural networks. There was two kind of networks created -Self Organizing Maps and MLP network.
1) Self-Organizing Maps
SOM analysis did not produce strict results. Because of many kinds of inputs, it was hard to feed and learn network with right data. It is possible to focus on this analysis in future for specic kind of network devices or servers. But for generalized monitoring system data, it is not suitable. Next utilization of SOM could be a ngerprint of servers or network devices. Each network device has its own unique features in data, and some process could save this features or classes of data into the database. But it needs much more investigation over concrete data which was not our goal. Monda is prepared for SOM statistics so anybody in future can try it and do its analysis of his data.
2) MLP network
MLP network is suitable for data classication and prediction and that was the right mathematical method to use. We used Weka software for neural networks analysis. Algorithm used to feed MLP:
• Choose Trigger which was most active in given Time Window
• Find all Items which caused Trigger to evaluate
• Add Items which correlated in same Time Window
• Exports of data
• Exclude data which were not signicant
3) Proposed Classier
The classier used for analysis is based on MLP feedforward ANN. Example can be found in Fig. 2 . It is the network with ve inputs, two classication outputs, and two hidden layers. It is the only example of network, real networks dier on each server because there were another number of inputs. Backpropagation was used to train network.
4) Training
We selected three servers which were most active during the analysis period. Two of them has another kind of utilization based on external events. Backup was selected because it was used in regular intervals and its run aected lot of other servers.
• IMAP -Mail server
• Horde -Webmail server
To classify or predict data we had to choose right time intervals to analyze. We took data being collected for seven days and divided into time intervals for 5 minutes, 30 minutes and 60 minutes. So we were able to classify/predict data according to these intervals. • 5 minutes -2016 rows
• 30 minutes -336 rows
• 60 minutes -168 rows Input data was divided in the ratio 70/30 (70% of train set to the 30% of verication set). Training was the rst step and verication second one. Next, we used test set from another time window.
During verication, we dened a rule which made false positives more interesting. It is due to the fact that it is good for the administrator to know about the potential incident and recheck the status of the system. So success rate of prediction was the ratio between detected plus notdetected problems and not-detected problems in the same time window.
5) Results
IMAP server did not show bigger dependencies between its items and there were no other data to use for prediction. If monitoring system contains more pieces of information (like the number of sent emails, discarded emails, logins etc.), the analysis could be much better as is depicted in Tab. 2. It is shown that none of the networks could be trained and veried with acceptable precision. This is due to external inuences which came from random access to email server from many users. Server backup had better success rate than IMAP. The classifying problem with a high success rate for 30 minute intervals was possible. In 5 minute intervals, the success rate was lower, see Tab 3. Webmail server showed best results. It was possible to predict problem within 30 minute periods with success rate as high as 93%. as is depicted in Tab. 4. Interesting results were found during analysis.
A new approach to identify network incidents was invented. We created software Monda which is Open-Source and it can be used by anybody to following analysis in Zabbix. Verication of methods was done on Silesian University data stored in the monitoring database. Data in monitoring system are interesting for next analysis. Even if it is relatively complex to choose right data and right intervals, data are suitable for prediction of some incidents. Monda can do preprocessing part very quickly and eective way directly within SQL server. Anybody can write its own analysis module to focus on specic incident or time. Algorithms used here are mainly based on logical assumptions which are derived from knowledge of monitoring system and its data.
Next assumption is that to do better analysis and prediction of incidents, the monitoring system must have more inputs about incidents on the network. In other words, more inputs related to security and statistics of systems, better analysis and prediction of incidents. We veried that we can achieve good results using MLP networks. The prediction could be even better if we save ngerprints of hosts. This means, to save vital statistical, correlation data and trends per each host and time interval. Deviation of this data could be used to better prediction. Next step is to interconnect Zabbix with logging server. It is theoretically possible to write a new module for Monda to do so.
Future improvements
First place for optimization is pre-processing of data. More information about stored data and their source mean better pre-processing of data. One of the improvements could be a manual description of Items inside Zabbix so preprocessor could know right ranges for given Items. Next, it would be nice if Zabbix could do data approximation on historical data. Zabbix deletes data from history after congured amount of days and computes Trends from it. So we can see minimum, maximum and average in hour intervals. 
